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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in
continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through
which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the
issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information
concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private
information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how
does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk aﬀect the quality of informa-
tion that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address thes question by
analyzing a speciﬁc class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model
of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.
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1I Introduction
During the past several decades, there has been progressively increasing awareness of the
importance of risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settle-
ment arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. Because a very
large loss can potentially be incurred if settlement of a payment fails, how such a loss would
be shared should be a matter of substantial concern for the participants in an arrangement.
Moreover, to the extent that complete contingent-claims markets do not exist for insurance
against settlement failures and that there are political pressures for governments or central
banks to assume losses from such failures, management of settlement risk is also a public
policy issue. The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management
in such settlement arrangements. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive
compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of
transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value
in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the
settlement risk aﬀect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this
paper, we address this question by analyzing a speciﬁc class of parametric environments of
a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.
Let us contemplate that a third party within a payment network has some private
information, not possessed by either the payer or the payee, about the level of risk. In such
a case, the information is potentially relevant to how the transaction should be conducted
and even to how large a transaction ought to be undertaken.
If the privately informed third party were involved solely as the reporter of that in-
formation to the concerned parties, then there would be no problem about ensuring the
truthfulness of the report. In particular, if compensation were required to induce reporting,
that compensation could be made in the form of a ﬂat fee. If the possessor of information
functions in the payments process as an agent for one of the principals in the transaction,
though, then there will generally be an issue of whether there is incentive for truthful re-
porting.1 One might think, for example, that eﬃciency would generally require a payments
network would have to penalize an information provider when a payment would fail without
a warning of particularly risky circumstances having been given.
We will show that there is indeed an incentive-compatibility issue for the payments
1This idea, that a dual role of privately informed members of a payments network is critical for under-
standing how the institutional design of a payment arrangement is related to the attainment of economic
eﬃciency, has previously been studied by Rochet and Tirole [4]. In their model, unlike the present one,
traders’ information can only be revealed through their trades, and not by making explicit report. In many
actual payments networks, the limited opportunities for traders to make explicit reports seem to fall be-
tween the absence of opportunity modeled by Rochet and Tirole and the completely adequate opportunity
modeled here. When traders are required to set prior limits (which will not necessarily ever be binding in
equilibrium) on their bilateral exposure to counterparties, for instance, their choices of which limits to set
can be regarded as partially informative reports of their private information about those counterparties’
riskiness.
1network to resolve, but that there is no simple generalization about how to resolve it.
The incentive for truthful revelation of information depends on the pattern of risk sharing
within the payments network, the diﬀerences in risk attitudes among members, and the
distribution of rents that is to be achieved by an incentive eﬃcient transaction mechanism
in a private-information environment. In fact, for the parametric environment that we
study, there are two distinctive cases in which some incentive eﬃcient mechanisms involve
a binding incentive-compatibility constraint for truthful revelation that a transfer is likely
to fail, while other incentive eﬃcient mechanisms involve a binding constraint for truthful
revelation that failure is unlikely. The case in which incentive eﬃcient mechanisms involve
a binding incentive-compatibility constraint for truthful revelation that a transfer is likely
to fail, that is, a constraint to prevent under-reporting of risks, prevails when costly but safe
transfer technology which is alternative to a risky transfer technology is not regarded too
costly from the social point of view. On the other hand, the case in which incentive eﬃcient
mechanisms involve a binding constraint for truthful revelation that failure is unlikely, that
is, a constraint to prevent over-reporting of risks, prevails when an alternative safe transfer
technology is too costly to be used from the social point of view. It may be worthwhile
to point out that the fact that the nature of incentive constraint depends upon allocations
on the Pareto eﬃcient frontier is very distinctive to the problem of settlement mechanisms
that seems not to have noticed in the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we give a detailed description of a model of
transfers of assets involving a risky transfer along with a description of sequence of infor-
mation and economic activities. A settlement system is formulated as an incentive eﬃcient
transaction mechanism. In the following section III, after specifying utility functions of
traders, analysis and discussions on incentive eﬃcient mechanisms are presented in an en-
vironment with perfectly accurate private information. In section IV we look at incentive
eﬃcient mechanisms in an environment with imperfectly accurate private information and
discuss the eﬀects of imperfection of information on the issues of incentive compatibility.
A concluding remark is given in section V.
II Model of a transaction – a transfer with a third
party
We ﬁrst formulate a simplest kind of model of a transaction that involves a risky asset
transfer. The model is simple enough to be analytically tractable.
A transaction is a related set of asset transfers between traders. The assets involved
might be either commodities or ﬁnancial assets. An asset transfer involves two traders, the
donor and the recipient, but a transaction can generally involve more than two traders.
Thus, a simplest model of a transaction involving a risky transfer will include three traders.
A distinction can be drawn thereby between a participant in the broad transaction and a
participant (that is, the donor or the recipient) in the speciﬁc transfer where the risk occurs.
2In order for the participant who is neither the donor nor the recipient of the risky transfer
t ob ee s s e n t i a lt om a k i n gam u t u a l l yb e n e ﬁcial transaction, there should be no “double
coincidence of wants” between the donor and the receiver. This consideration suggests
modeling the three participants as a “Wicksell triangle.”
A third party to risky transfer in a Wicksell triangle might be intrinsically necessary in
the sense that the donor and recipient of the risky transfer would have no double coincidence
of wants, even if the transfer did not involve risk (that is, if the recipient would receive the
expected value of the transfer with certainty). Alternatively, the riskiness of the transfer
might impair a double coincidence of wants that would exist under certainty between the
donor and the recipient, and the third party might be needed solely to restore that double
coincidence by serving as a guarantor or insurer of the transfer. 2
On the basis of these considerations, we will specify the set of traders in a simplest
possible way to be {1,2,3}. We will assume that trader 1 is essential to a mutually beneﬁcial
transaction but that trader 2 is the donor and trader 3 is the recipient of the risky transfer.
In the following subsections we give a mathematical description of our model.
Probability structure
The risky transfer will beformalized in terms of a probability space of events (in Ω)o nw h i c h
a probability measure Pr is deﬁned. There is a distinguished event S,w i t h0< Pr(S) < 1.
Assume that the risky transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 succeeds in S, and that it fails
in the complementary event F. When we say that the transfer succeeds, we mean that
trader 3 receives the entire quantity of the asset that is transferred. When we say that the
transfer fails, we mean that the quantity of the asset that was intended to be transferred
disappears irretrievably from the economy.3
To model private information, we suppose that an event that is statistically relevant
to the outcome of that risky transfer will be privately observed by trader 1, who is not
directly involved in the risky transfer but who is an essential participant in a mutually
beneﬁcial transaction among the traders. To consider the simplest case of nontrivial private
information, suppose that trader 1 observes which element of the partition P = {H,L} of
Ω contains the true state of nature. We suppose that H and L satisfy
0 ≤ Pr(S|L) < Pr(S) < Pr(S|H) ≤ 1. (1)
Write σL =P r ( S|L), σS =P r ( S|H), and σ =P r ( S)s ot h a t0≤ σL < σ < σS ≤ 1. The
elements of P will be referred to as signals that trader 1 observes.
2We ﬁnd it useful to characterize the diﬀerences between the roles of these two types of third parties in
discussing a role of the central bank or the government with regards to settlement failures. In such a case,
a four-trader model (including both an intrinsic third party and a trader whose only involvement would be
to share risk) can be useful. See, e.g., Fujiki, Green, and Yamazaki (1999).
3Failure of an actual transfer seldom involves such an irretrievable loss, although there are some con-
temporary examples and many historical examples of that type of failure.
3Endowments and preferences
Assume that each trader i has an endowment consisting solely a type of commodity that
only he possesses. We denote that type of commodity also by i. Intuitively, trader i is
endowed with one unit of commodity of type i with certainty.
In general, a commodity bundle provides a random amount of each of the three types of
commodity in the economy. That is, each trader can acquire commodities by transactions
with others, and randomness is introduced by the riskiness of the transactions technology.4
We use the letter γ to denote such a random commodity bundle.
Each trader’s preference between commodity bundles conforms to expected utility.
Trader i has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Ui:R3
+ → R ∪ {−∞}.T r a d e r
i’s expected utility of consuming a commodity bundle γ is the expectation of the random
variable Ui(~ γ).
Information and a sequence of economic activities
The sequence of economic activities in this economy is as follows. Initially, before any
information is observed, traders make an agreement with one another for transfers of goods
among them. The agreement among the traders is binding. Trader 1 will observe a signal
H or L before the ﬁrst round of transfers takes place. Thus it is natural for the agreement
to specify that trader 1 will report what he observes, and that his report will determine
which transaction to make. Note, however, that this contingent agreement is made ex ante,
before trader 1 has had an opportunity to make any observation.
Figure 1: A sequence of information and economic activiteis
Trader(s)
Activities









The traders agree on an initial round of transfers among them. With one exception, the
4One could introduce the kind of randomness treated in this paper as an endowment shock. However,
in order to do so, one needs to distinguish goods by the location of each trader. While it is a standard
convention to distinguish commodities by their location, given a very simple environment studied in this
paper, it is not only convenient to treat the randomness as one coming from transfer technologies but is
also appropriate to think the randomness is due to transfer technologies in this paper.
4transfers are safe. That is, everything sent out reaches its intended recipient in its entirety
and with certainty. The exception is the transfer of trader 2’s endowment to trader 3.
Recall that this transfer reaches trader 3 in its entirety in event S, but is completely and
irretrievably lost in event F. Whether the transfer will succeed or fail is not known at the
time that the traders make their agreement.
The traders also agree ex ante on a second round of transfers, to be made after the
ﬁrst transfers have been completed and the result of the risky transfer has become known.
Thus the transfer to be made in the second round can be made contractually contingent on
which of the events S and F has occurred.5 All second-round transfers, including the one
from trader 2 to trader 3, are nonstochastic. However, second-round transfers are costly.
Only a proportion ρ,( 0< ρ < 1), of the goods that a trader sends in the second round are
received.6
After the agreement has been made, trader 1 privately observes whether signal H or
L will occur. Trader 1 reports this observation to the others. It is feasible for trader 1 to
make an untruthful report, since the other traders do not directly observe H or L,a n dt h e y
cannot infer with certainty which of those events have been observed from their subsequent
observation of S or F.7
The two rounds of contractually speciﬁed transfers are then made. Traders consume
their stocks of goods after these two rounds of transfers have been completed.
Consumption determined by transfers
To simplify the characterization of traders’ consumption resulting from settlement, we make
two assumptions: that a trader is able to transfer only his own endowment good, and that
only a few of the possible ﬂows of those goods are feasible. Speciﬁcally, trader 1 can make
a transfer to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 1.8 (Traders 1,2, and 3 together will constitute the Wicksell
triangle to which reference was made earlier.) Thus, a round of transfers is a vector φ ∈ R3
+.
5Strictly speaking, this sentence describes a diﬀerent information structure from the preceding one. If
traders can only distinguish between events S and F on the basis of observing the success or failure of a
transfer, then they can not make any distinction unless a (non-zero) transfer has been attempted. To assume
that they can make a state-contingent transfer in the second round even if no ﬁrst-round transfer from 2
to 3 has been attempted neglects this limitation of their opportunity for inference. In the case where there
is no private information, this ambiguity is harmless because risk-averse traders would not cooperatively
choose to make a state-contingent transfer in the second round unless they had exposed themselves to
settlement risk in the ﬁrst round. How the ambiguity is resolved is important in the private-information
case, though, and we will discuss this issue further below.
6This assumption, sometimes called “iceberg cost,” can be viewed as a crude way of reﬂecting various
intuitive considerations including time preference and exposure to business loss due to delayed availability
of transferred funds.
7To be exact, this statement applies to the cases below in which either information is not perfectly
accurate or the events S and F cannot be veriﬁed without a positive risky transfer made from trader 2 to
3 even if information is perfectly accurate.
8Strictly speaking, possible ﬂows of goods will be expressed via utility functions of traders.
5The coeﬃcients of φ are interpreted as follows.
1. φ1 is the amount to be sent from trader 1 to trader 2;
2. φ2 is the amount to be sent from trader 2 to trader 3;
3. φ3 is the amount to be sent from trader 3 to trader 1.






As described above, either all, a proportion ρ, or none of the goods sent may be received.
A transaction is a sequence τ =( τ1,τS,τF) of rounds of transfers. The elements τ1, τS,
and τF specify the initial round of transfers, the second round of transfers in event S,a n d
the round of transfers in event F, respectively.
A transaction is feasible if no trader is ever required to send a cumulative amount that
would exceed his endowment. That is, transaction τ is feasible if
∀i τ
1




i } ≤ 1. (2)
Let T denote the set of feasible transactions. 9
Now we provide an explicit deﬁnition of traders’ consumptions resulting from a trans-
action. To begin, let τχ be the random net trade that results from transaction τ,w h i c h
depends on whether event S or F instead occurs. That is, we deﬁne for each ω, τχ(ω)=
χS(ω)τS+χF(ω)τF where χS and χF denote the indicator functions of S and F respectively.
Let z1 =( 1 ,0,0),z2 =( 0 ,1,0), and z3 =( 0 ,0,1) in terms of which these consumptions
are deﬁned. By adding the positions of a particular trader in all such net trades in which
that trader is involved to the trader’s endowment, the random consumption of the trader
is determined. Speciﬁcally the consumption vector ci(τ,ω)t h a tt r a d e ri receives as a con-
sequence of transaction τ is as follows.
9As noted in the footnote above, the informational constraint that, if τ1
2 =0 ,t h e nτS = τF,m a yo r
not be added to the deﬁnition of feasibility for a transaction.
6c











i =1 ,2,3( m o d 3 ) (3)
Incentive-eﬃcient transaction mechanisms
The agreement among traders regarding the structure of the transaction, described above,
is an ex ante agreement, made before trader 1 has received any information. However,
trader 1 will observe H or L before the ﬁrst round of transfers takes place. Thus it is
natural for the agreement to specify that trader 1 will report what he observes, and that
his report will determine which transaction to make. That is, the agreement among the
traders speciﬁes a transaction mechanism rather than a single transaction. Formally, a
transaction mechanism is a mapping µ:P → T .10 Thus, given a mechanism µ, µ(H)
denotes the contractually agreed upon transaction when trader 1 reports the signal to be
H.
Transaction mechanism µ will elicit truthful reporting from trader 1 if the following






Let M denote the set of incentive-compatible transaction mechanisms. We restrict at-
tention to incentive-compatible mechanisms, as is justiﬁed by the revelation principle.11 If
µ ∈ M, then the resulting transaction τ and the consumption Γi for each trader i =1 ,2,3

















and the resulting transactions are feasible. Finally, deﬁne a feasible mechanism µ ∈ M
to be incentive eﬃcient if it is Pareto eﬃcient within M, that is, if there exist no other
feasible mechanism ν ∈ M such that
10Strictly speaking, µ is deﬁned on {‘H’,‘L’} where ‘H’ and ‘L’ are names for the events H and L.
They are merely linguistic reports of events and may defer from actual events themselves if not reported
truthfully. However, we ﬁnd it convenient to abuse notation and treat µ to be deﬁned on P.











III A parametric environment with accurate private
information
For convenience, we assume throughout that success and failure as well as their private
signals have equal probability. That is, we assume that Pr(S)=P r ( F)=P r ( H)=
Pr(L)=1 /2. We start from the case in which trader 1’s signal is perfectly accurate in the
sense that Pr(S|H)=1a n dP r ( S|L)=0 .
We work with piecewise-linear utility functions for the traders. Their utilities will be
deﬁned in terms of parameters δ and ², which are assumed to satisfy 0 <²<δ < 1/4.12
Utility functions are deﬁned in terms of the following functions on the nonnegative real
numbers.
V (x)=m i n {1,x} + ²max{0,x− 1};
W(x)=m i n {1/2,x} + ²max{0,x− 1/2}. (7)





2(c)=V (c1 + c2);
U
3(c)=W(c2)+δc3. (8)
Example 1 [Trades]: The model most directly resembles settlement by delivery of goods
in early international and interregional trade. Trader 1, who is an intermediary, ships the
endowment good of trader 2 trader 3 by giving trader 2 a part of his endowment good
as a settlement payment, and trader 2 gives trader 1 his endowment good to settle the
transaction. A part of the ﬁrst round transfers may be interpreted as “insurance premium”
and that of the second round transfers as insurance payments.
Example 2 [Money payment through an intermediary]: Suppose that trader 2 transfers
a good to trader 3, who settles in money through intermediary trader 1. And think of the
endowment good of trader 2 as being produced by a technology with constant marginal
cost 1. The utility functions of trader 1 and 2 in (8) can be thought of as specifying indirect
utility of wealth.
12One may note that only the value of δ and ² relative to that of Pr(S) is important.
8Because trader 1’s utility function is linear and information is perfectly accurate, the
incentive-compatibility constraint reduces to the following two equations. The ﬁrst and




































Subject to both technological and incentive constraints, a transfer mechanism is incentive
eﬃcient if and only if it implements a Pareto eﬃcient allocation that is individually rational
for each trader. An allocation that maximizes a weighted sum of traders’ expected utilities,
with all weights strictly positive is Pareto eﬃcient. Therefore, for α ∈ R3






Although a vector (α1,α2,α3) corresponds to a speciﬁcp o i n ti nt h eP a r e t oe ﬃcient utility
allocation frontier, it is useful to think these vectors as generating diﬀerent transfer “ﬂows”
among traders when analyzing transactions in our framework. This will become apparent
below.
Regarding the transfer technology, we will assume that13
ρ =1 /2. (11)
A IC constraint can bind in H
Let α satisfy the following conditions.
δα3 < α1 < α2 < α3;
ρα3 = α3/2 < α2. (12)
(For example, if ² =1 /10 and δ =2 /10, then α =( 2 ,3,4) satisﬁes the inequalities (12).)
These values of αi’s correspond to a case in which ﬁrst round transfers between traders 1
and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 1 are warranted by the social welfare maximization of (10), and
second round transfer from 2 to 3 is viewed socially too costly to be performed. Consider a
transfer, contingent on an announcement of trader 1’s information that is assumed for the
moment to be truthful, that would maximize the social welfare U for this value of α.I t
must have the following features, where ci
j denotes the amount of consumption by trader i
of the endowment good of trader j.
• If trader 1 announces event H, then the following transfers should be made in the
ﬁrst round. Trader 3 should send his entire endowment to trader 1, because δα3 < α1.
13Again the speciﬁcv a l u eo fρ is not important as long as ρ ≤ σ.
9Trader 2 should send half a unit to trader 3, because ²α3 < α2 < α3. After having
made that transfer, c2
2 =1 /2. Therefore trader 1 should send half a unit to trader 2,
so that c2
1 + c2
2 =1 ,b e c a u s e²α2 < (δα3 <)α1 < α2.
• If trader 1 announces event L, then the following transfers should be made. In this
case, also, trader 3 should send his entire endowment to trader 1 in the ﬁrst round,
because δα3 < α1. However, trader 2 should send nothing to trader 3 in either round.
Such a transfer would fail in the ﬁrst round by the assumption that trader 1 announces
the truth, and it should not be made in the second round because ρα3 < α2.T h u s ,
since the condition that c2
1 +c2
2 ≥ 1 will be satisﬁed, trader 1 should send nothing to
trader 2, because ²α2 < α1.
• Since trader 1 has perfectly accurate information, transfers in round 1 can be op-
timized contingent on whether a transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 would actually
succeed or fail. Therefore, no further transfer is needed in round 2. Since making
a transfer in round 2 would incur an “iceberg cost” that is avoidable in round 1, no
transfer should be made in round 2 after the transfers described above have been
made in round 1.
We ﬁnd it convenient to represent the above arguments by diagrams. In Figure 3 a circled
letter H or L is the report on a signal that have been observed by trader 1. To each report
of a signal corresponds three triangles whose vertices represent a trader numbered from 1
to 3. A number placed along an edge between two vertices represent a transfer between
two traders. Each triangle represents a round of transfers. The ﬁrst round transfer, the
second round transfer in the event S, and the second round transfer in the event F are
represented in this order from the outer triangle to the inner triangle. Thus, an optimal
transaction mechanism that would imply the above transfers and its associated contingent
allocation if trader 1 were to report truthfully, is expressed by Figure 3.
The corresponding transaction mechanism is speciﬁed by
˜ µ =
³











This mechanism is individually rational for all traders, but it is not incentive compatible.
Speciﬁcally, trader 1 always has incentive to announce event L, regardless of his actual
observation, in order to avoid having to give up half of his endowment.
In order to make the mechanism incentive compatible, it must be modiﬁed so that, if
the trader 1 observes event H, then he will consume no more (total of goods 1 and 3)
by misrepresenting his observation as L than by truthfully announcing H. This can be
a c c o m p l i s h e dw h i l er e t a i n i n gt h es a m ee q u i l i b r i u ma l l o c a t i o na s˜ µ would provide, by deﬁn-
ing transaction mechanism µ to be identical to ˜ µ except that µS
1(L)=1 .T h ec o n t i n g e n t
transfer µS
1(L) will never be made in equilibrium (by the IC constraint) so it does not
reduce the value of the planer’s objective function relative to truthful reporting subject
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(∵ σ(S|L)=0 ,ρα3 < α2)
001
(∵ δα3 < α1)
As we pointed out in the introduction, one might have thought that eﬃciency would
generally require a payments network would have to penalize an information provider when
a payment would fail without a warning of particularly risky circumstances having been
given. Instead, the above argument shows that when the second round transfer from
11trader 2 to 3 is regarded socially too costly, then the payment network need to penalize
the informed trader for causing the network to miss an opportunity of mutually beneﬁcial
transactions by misleading uniformed traders to believe ﬁrst round transfer from 2 to 3
is extremely risky. Since informed trader 1, interpreted to be acting as an intermediary
between traders 2 and 3, can also be thought of as a provider of an insurance, it might
sound unintuitive, at least at ﬁrst glance, that an insurer has an incentive to report that
the transfer is extremely risky when it is indeed very safe.
This may be a good place to explain basic diﬀerences existing between a standard
model of optimal insurance and the model of this paper. There seems to be at least two
fundamental diﬀerences between these two models. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that “insurance”
payments themselves might face a risky transfer. (This particularly is the case when the
second round transfer from trader 2 to 3 is too costly, i.e., ρα3 < α2, so that virtually
the network cannot avail itself a safe second round transfer technology between traders
2 and 3.) The insured are not information holders concerning riskiness, but the insurer
is. These two features seem to create unique aspects of the incentive compatibility issues
in the present model. An intuitive explanation of why there is an incentive constraint in
reporting the signal H might be given as follows. If trader 1 reports signal L truthfully,
then everyone knows that the ﬁrst round transfer from 2 to 3 surely fails. Now, from social
point of view, trader 3 should make the ﬁrst round transfer of his endowment good to 1
regardless of signals observed by 1. A part of this transfer is considered to be a payment
of “insurance premiums” of traders 2 and 3. However, if trader 1 announces L truthfully,
no transfers are made from 2 to 3 because the ﬁrst round transfer is sure to fail and the
second round transfer should not be made from the social point of view. This means that
even the insurance payments to trader 3 must be transferred from 1 to 3 through 2 when
1 announces H whereas no insurance payments are made to 3 in case of L. Thus, trader
1, as an insurer, is put in the position where he is better oﬀ to announce L even when he
observes the signal H.
In summary, care has to be taken to specify a transfer mechanism that maximizes
U(µ,α) in a way that achieves incentive compatibility, but having to impose the incentive-
compatibility constraint need not make any trader worse oﬀ t h a nh ew o u l db ei na ne n v i -
ronment where all traders could observe P directly. In this sense, incentive-compatibility
is not a binding constraint in the environment where the IC constraint binds in H and
the partition {S,F} is observed regardless of whether transfer from trader 2 to 3 is actu-
ally made. In a sense this result is naturally expected because second round transfers are
Arrow-Debreu type contingent contracts. However, it is important to realize that the fact
that Arrow-Debreu type contingent contracts can be written among traders, itself will not
eliminate the issues of incentive compatibility. Later in this paper, we will establish that
incentive-compatibility can be a binding constraint when the information of trader 1 is less
than perfectly accurate.
12BW h a t i f S could not be distinguished from F without a non-
zero transfer being made?
The foregoing discussion has assumed that the events S and F could be distinguished even
if no transfer were attempted (that is, if a zero transfer were speciﬁed). The alternative
assumption, thatthe uniformed traders can only learn about these events through the actual
success or failure of a non-zero transfer, may be thought to be more widely applicable and
leaves little rooms for questioning the veriﬁability of the events.
Under this assumption, incentive compatibility in case of IC constraint binding in H,
can be achieved by requiring trader 1 to transfer half of his endowment to trader 2 in L,o r
else by having trader 3 retain half of his endowment rather than transferring it to trader 1
in L. (Because the environment is piecewise linear, combinations of these two modiﬁcations
do not have to be considered.) Because ²<δ, having trader 3 retain half of his endowment
achieves the higher value of U.T h a t i s U(µ,α) achieves a higher value by deﬁning µ so
that
• Trader 1 sends half a unit to trader 2, and trader 2 sends half a unit to trader 3, in
H;
• Trader 1 sends nothing to trader 2, and trader 2 sends nothing to trader 3, in L;















There are two other possibilities to achieve incentive compatibility when the events S
and F can not be distinguished without a non-zero ﬁrst round transfer from trader 2 to
3. One possibility is that when no ﬁrst round transfer is attempted by trader 2, trader 1
in second round could make non-contingent second round transfers. In this case trader 1
need to send half a unit to trader 2 regardless of the events S and F when L is announced.
This would obviously give a lower value of U than would having trader 1 send half a unit
in the ﬁrst round because of the iceberg cost in the second round.
The second possibility is to have trader 2 send a small amount, say λ, to trader 3 in
round 1 to ﬁnd out prevailing event and then to have trader 1 send one unit in round 2 in














For a positive value of λ suﬃciently small, for example any values of λ less than (α1 −
δα3)/2α2, µ in (16) will give a greater value of U than the one in (15). And this value of
13U becomes larger as λ becomes smaller, hence there is no maximum value for U.A tﬁrst
glance it might seem worrisome that the maximum value of U does not exist. However, it
helps to consider what it means to be able to have a value of λ arbitrarily close to zero
in the context of transfer of assets. If we are interested in the question of the settlement
risk arising from a solvency risk, we may not want to allow the values of λ arbitrarily close
to zero. In such a case we might be content with the incentive compatible mechanism µ
given in (15). On the other hand, if we are concerned with operational risks arising from
the operation of a network, then settlement risks could involve the values of λ arbitrarily
close to zero. But, then, to the extent that zero transfers can be made to ﬁnd out whether
network transfers are safe or not, we can be content with the mechanism µ in (14) instead
of (16).
Compared to the level of U attained by µ deﬁn e di n( 1 4 ) ,t h el e v e lo fU given by µ in (15)
declines by the amount of (α1−δα3)/4w h e r e a sµ in (16) decreases the level by the amount
of λα2/2. Therefore, in any case, when events S and F cannot be distinguished without
a positive round 1 transfer made from trader 2 to trader 3, the incentive compatibility
conditions really become binding in consumption to be achieved even when information is
perfectly accurate. Thus the elicitation of truthful report from the informed trader will
impose social costs to network participants. This may not be surprising because the fact
that traders cannot distinguish the events without some positive transfer made in round
1 despite a complete risk of non-arrival may be thought of as another way of introducing
an inaccuracy of information. By summarizing the arguments of the two subsections, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the given parametric speciﬁcation of the above two subsections, in
which a safe second round transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 is too costly from social point
of view, (for an optimal and individually rational transaction mechanism) there will be a
problem of possible over-reporting by the informed trader concerning the risk involved in
a risky transfer from 2 to 3. If the signal observed by the informed trader is perfectly
accurate, and if information can be veriﬁed by uniformed traders regardless of contents
of their contracts, then there will be no social costs of imposing incentive compatibility.
However, if there is a problem of veriﬁcation of signal observed by the informed trader
without a positive risky transfer made from trader 2 to 3, then there will be a social cost of
imposing incentive compatibility.
C IC constraint can bind in L
Let us now look at the case in which the use of a safe second round transfer technology
from trader 2 to 3 is not too costly from the social point of view. This means that we
change α so that making transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 even in the second round is
appropriate to maximize the α-weighted sum of utilities. Thus, let α satisfy the following
conditions.
δα3 < α1 < α2 < ρα3 = α3/2. (17)
14(For example, if ² =1 /10 and δ =2 /10, then α =( 2 ,3,8) satisﬁes the inequalities (17).)
Since trader 1, as an intermediary and an insurer, can transfer “payments” to trader 3
through trader 2 in the event F, one would expect just as in a standard insurance model
that trader 1 would have incentive to under-report the risk involved in the transfer from 2
to 3. The following argument shows that this is exactly what happens in this case.
The transaction mechanism ˜ µ that maximizes U for the value of α satisfying (17) has
the following characteristics. (See Figure 5.)
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• If trader 1 announces H truthfully, then all the transfers among traders should be
the same as in the previous case since the only diﬀerence from the previous case is
the social evaluation of iceberg costs in terms of α2 and ρα3 and there are no second
round transfers when H is announced.
• If trader 1 announces L truthfully, then trader 3 sends one unit to trader 1. Trader
2 sends nothing to trader 3 in the ﬁrst round, but sends one unit to trader 3 in the
second round since we now have α2 < ρα3. Trader 3 only receives half a unit because
of the iceberg cost. Trader 1 sends one unit to trader 2 in the ﬁrst round.
Thus, the transaction mechanism ˜ µ is speciﬁed as follows.
˜ µ =
³











Again, this mechanism is individually rational for all traders but is not incentive compat-
ible. Speciﬁcally, trader 1 always has incentive to announce the signal H (i.e., under-report
the risk of transfer), regardless of his actual observation, so that he will be required to
transfer only half of his endowment, rather than all of it.
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In order to make the mechanism incentive compatible, it must be modiﬁed so that, if
the trader 1 observes the signal L, then he will consume no more by misrepresenting his
observation as H than by truthfully announcing L. This can be accomplished while retain-
ing the same equilibrium allocation as ˜ µ would provide, by deﬁning transaction mechanism
µ to be identical to ˜ µ except that µF
1 (H)=1 /2. The contingent transfer µF
1 (H) will never
be made in equilibrium so again it does not reduce the value of the planer’s objective func-
tion relative to truthful reporting subject to the transfer mechanism ˜ µ. Thus, an incentive














Hence, the incentive-compatibility is not a binding constraint in the environment where
the IC constraint binds in L and the partition {S,F} is observed regardless of whether
transfer from trader 2 to 3 is actually made.
S and F distinguished only with a non-zero transfer
Let us assume that the uniformed traders can only learn about the events S and F through
the actual success or failure of a non-zero transfer made in the ﬁrst round, and see how the
requirement alters an incentive compatible mechanism in this case.
When trader 1 announces his observation of signal to be H, the mechanism µ in (19)
requires trader 1 to send one half unit to trader 2 contingent on the event F in the second
round in addition to one half unit sent in the ﬁrst round. Since trader 2 also sends one
half unit to trader 3 in the ﬁrst round, there is no problem of veriﬁcation of event by the
uniformed traders. However, when trader 1 announces his observation of signal to be L,t h e
mechanism µ requires trader 2 to send one unit to trader 3 in the event F, but uniformed
16traders 2 and 3 will not be able to verify whether F took place or not because trader 2
sends nothing to trader 3 in the ﬁrst round. Therefore, one possibility is for trader 2 to
make non-contingent second round transfers. This means that trader 2 sends one unit to 3
regardless of the events S and F.T h el e v e lo fU will not be changed by this modiﬁcation
of µ because Pr(S|L) = 0. The other possibility is for trader 2 to send trader 3 a small
amount λ in round 1 for a veriﬁcation of event. This, however, reduces the level of U by
the amount of (1/2)λα2. Thus, the former way of changing µ maximizes U. Therefore, the















Let us summarize the arguments of this subsection as follows.
Proposition 2 Under the given parametric speciﬁcation of this subsection, in which a safe
second round transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 is not too costly from social point of view,
(for an optimal and individually rational transaction mechanism) there will be a problem
of possible under-reporting by the informed trader concerning the risk involved in a risky
transfer from 2 to 3. If the signal observed by the informed trader is perfectly accurate,
then there will be no social costs of imposing incentive compatibility. In this case, even
if there is a problem of veriﬁcation by the uniformed traders of the signal observed by the
informed trader without a positive risky transfer made from trader 2 to 3, there will not be a
social cost of imposing incentive compatibility because an appropriate incentive for truthful
r e p o r t i n gi sc r e a t e di nt h ec a s eo fH when a positive ﬁrst round transfer from trader 2 to 3
is perfectly safe.
From proposition 1 and proposition 2 one could infer that the preciseness of information
must be related to the costs of imposing incentive compatibility of truthful reporting by an
information holder. Thus, we now like to turn to a parametric environment in which the
information conveyed by H and L is not perfectly accurate.
IV A parametric environment with imperfectly accu-
rate private information
Let us consider the case where the information conveyed by H and L is not perfectly
accurate so that
0 < σL =P r ( S|L) < σ =P r ( S) < σH =P r ( S|H) < 1. (21)
Since we are interested in the incentive compatibility issues of truthful reporting of infor-
mation observed by an informed trader, it seems natural to require the information to be
17suﬃciently accurate. We express this by requiring conditional probabilities σH and σL to
satisfy
σH =P r ( S|H) > 1 − ²,σL =P r ( S|L) <² . (22)




, δα3 < α1 < α2 < α3,ρ =1 /2. (23)
In addition we impose the condition
1
1 − ²
α2 < α3, (24)
which insures
α2 < σHα3 (25)
and is interpreted to say that a risky transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 is appropriate to
maximize the α-weighted sum of utilities when H is truthfully announced.
With less than perfectly accurate information, the incentive-compatibility constraints
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A Costly safe transfer technology
As in the previous section III, we like to analyze two diﬀerent environments, one with
costly second round safe transfer technology between traders 2 and 3 and the other with
less costly case from the social point of view. Thus, let α satisfy the condition, ρα3 < α2 in
this subsection. Then, an incentive compatible transaction mechanism µ that is individually
rational and maximizes the value of U must have the following features. (See Figure 7.)
• If trader 1 announces H, then the following transfers should be made in the ﬁrst
round. Trader 3 should send his entire endowment to trader 1 because δα3 < α1.
Trader 2 should make a transfer of his endowment to trader 3 even if there is a risk
in transfer because this risk is small relative to his contribution to social utility U
given the information H and assuming trader 1 announces truth, because α2 < σHα3.
However, trader 2 should send only up to half a unit to trader 3 because ²α3 < α2.
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(Since there is a probability 1 − σH of non-arrival, trader 3’s expected utility is
σH/4w h i c hi sg r e a t e rt h a nδ even when he receives nothing in L. In other words,
trader 3’s expected utility is higher than that obtained by consuming his own entire
endowment.) Trader 1 should make a transfer of his endowment to trader 2 because
α1 < α2, but no less and no more than half a unit because ²α2 < α1.
• If trader 1 announces L, then the following transfers should be made. Trader 3 should
send his entire endowment to trader 1 in the ﬁrst round, because δα3 < α1.D e s p i t e
trader 1’s announcement of L, it is not a perfectly accurate information of the event
F. There is a possibility of σL that a transfer he might make in the ﬁrst round may
succeed (under the assumption that trader 1 announces the truth). However, trader 2
should send nothing to trader 3 in the ﬁrst round, because his information is accurate
enough to have σLα3 <² α3 < α2. Transfer should not be made in the second round
either because ρα3 < α2. If trader 1 were to send nothing to trader 2 in either round
because ²α2 < α1, then the mechanism µ would not be incentive compatible. Trader
1 would have incentive to announce L regardless of his actual observation in order to
avoid giving up half of his endowment which he is required to do if he announces H.
Thus, the mechanism should specify an amount of µS
1(L) in the interval [1/2σH,1]
since, then, trader 1’s expected utility of announcing L instead of announcing the
true H would not exceed that of announcing H.
• Although trader 1 does not have perfectly accurate information, no further transfer
is needed in round 2 since making a transfer in round 2 would incur an iceberg cost
that is avoidable in round 1.
19Thus, an incentive compatible transaction mechanism that maximizes U(µ,α)i ss p e c i ﬁed














If we do not require incentive compatibility, U(˜ µ,α)i sm a x i m i z e db yd e ﬁning ˜ µ as
follows just as in (13) although information is not perfectly accurate.
˜ µ =
³











Thus, as anticipated earlier, the incentive compatibility requirement becomes a real con-
straint as the utility U(µ,α) is reduced by the amount of (1/4)(σL/σH)(α1 − ρ²α2)a s
compared to the level given by ˜ µ in (28). Let us note that the extent of this reduction
becomes larger as the precision of information as reﬂected by the inverse of the ratio σL/σH
declines. In the case of perfectly accurate information, we have σL/σH =0 .
If S could not be distinguished from F without a non-zero transfer being made as in
the previous section, then incentive compatibility can be achieved in four diﬀerent ways.
1. Trader 1 makes non-contingent second round transfer of 1/2σH units to trader 2.
2. Require trader 1 to transfer half of his endowment to trader 2 in L.T h u s , i n t h i s
case, µ1
1(L)=1 /2.
3. Require trader 3 to retain half of his endowment rather than transferring it to trader
1i nL so that µ1
3(L)i sr e d u c e dt o1 /2.
4. Require trader 2 in L to send an amount λ to trader 3 in round 1 so that trader 1
can ﬁnd out the event S, and then trader 1 to send the amount 1/2σH in round 2 in
event S,t h a ti s ,µ1
2(L)=λ, µS
1(L)=1 /2σH.
Among these alternatives the ﬁrst one is clearly worse than the second, and the second one
in turn is worse than the third because we have δα3 >² α2.B u tj u s ta si nt h ec a s eo ft h e
previous section, for values of λ suﬃciently small, the fourth alternative will give a higher
value of U(µ,α) but otherwise the third alternative maximizes the value of U(µ,α).
The following proposition summarizes the arguments of this section.
Proposition 3 Under the given parametric speciﬁcation of this subsection, in which a safe
second round transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 is too costly from the social point of view,
(for an optimal and individually rational transaction mechanism) there will be a problem
of possible over-reporting by the informed trader concerning the risk involved in a risky
transfer from 2 to 3. If the signal observed by the informed trader is imperfectly accurate,
then there will be social costs of imposing incentive compatibility which increase as the
accuracy of information conveyed by the signals declines.
20B Not too costly safe transfer technology
Now, let us assume that the safe second round transfer technology from trader 2 to 3 is
not too costly so that transfer from trader 2 to 3 even with iceberg cost is appropriate
to maximize the α-weighted sum of utilities. Thus, let α satisfy the condition α2 < ρα3.
Then, a transaction mechanism ˜ µ that is individually rational and maximizes the value of
U have the following characteristics.
• If trader 1 announces H, trader 3 sends entire unit of his endowment to trader 1.
Trader 2 sends half a unit of his endowment to trader 3 despite a risk of transfer
failure because this risk is small relative to the importance of making such a transfer,
i.e. σHα3 > α2. Trader 1 sends half a unit to trader 2. When trader 1 announces H,
transfers to be made are exactly the same as in the case of the previous subsection.
• If trader 1 announces L, trader 3 sends a full unit to trader 1. Trader 2 sends nothing
to trader 3 in round 1 because the risk of non-arrival is suﬃciently high that the
maximization of U does not warrant such a transfer (i.e, σLα3 < α2), but sends one
unit in round 2 regardless of the state to prevail, because a second round transfer
from trader 2 to trader 3 even with iceberg cost is appropriate, i.e. α2 < ρα3,a n d
this cost reduces the actual receipt of transfer by trader 3 by half a unit. Trader 1
sends his entire endowment of one unit to trader 2.
Therefore, the following ˜ µ maximizes the weighted sum U of utilities. (See Figure 8.)
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21Again, this mechanism ˜ µ is not incentive compatible. There are four possible ways to make
the mechanism incentive compatible.
1. In H, trader 3 withholds half a unit and sends to trader 1 only half a unit so that
µ1
3(H)=1 /2.
2. In H, require trader 1 to make an additional second round transfer of 1/2(1 − σL)
units in the event F, i.e., µF
1 (H)=1 /2(1 − σL).
3. In H, trader 1 sends an additional one half unit to trader 2 so that µ1
1(H)=1 .
4. In L, trader 1 withholds half a unit and sends only half a unit to trader 2 so that
µ1
1(L)=1 /2.
All the above modiﬁcations will reduce the weighted sum of utilities. The third modiﬁcation
will reduce the utilities more than the ﬁrst modiﬁcation, because δα3 >² α2.O n e c a n
check that it is also worse than the second since σH > σL. One can also verify that if the
information conveyed by the signals H and L is suﬃciently accurate and σH u 1,σL u
0, then the second alternative above maximizes U. But as the quality of information
deteriorates, there is a range of values of σH and σL such that either the ﬁr s to rt h et h i r d
alternative gives the highest value of U depending upon whether (α2 + δα3)/2 > α1 or
not. Therefore, the transaction mechanism µ that is incentive compatible and maximizes










































if (α2 + δα3)/2 ≤ α1.
As in the previous subsection let us note again that the cost of imposing incentive
compatibility, as measured by a reduction of weighted-sum of utilities U(µ,α), increases as
the precision of information declines because it results in a decline of the denominator of
the term 1/2(1 − σL). But this cost is bounded because when the quality of information
deteriorates beyond some point, then the mechanism expressed by either (31) or (32) gives
a higher value that does not depend upon the precision of the information.
By summarizing the arguments above we obtain the following proposition.
22Proposition 4 Under the given parametric speciﬁcation of this subsection, in which a safe
second round transfer from trader 2 to trader 3 is not too costly from the social point of view,
(for an optimal and individually rational transaction mechanism) there will be a problem
of possible under-reporting by the informed trader concerning the risk involved in a risky
transfer from 2 to 3. If the signal observed by the informed trader is not perfectly accurate,
then there will be social costs of imposing incentive compatibility. This cost increases as the
precision of information conveyed by the signals declines but is bounded.
V Conclusion
If we regard the crucial issue in the settlement system as the eﬃcient risk sharing among the
participants in the presence of private information, the rules in a settlement system must
encourage the participants to take optimal degrees of risk in accordance with their attitude
towards risk. If some participants have socially useful private information, the rules in a
settlement system must be constructed that it does not give participant adverse incentives
to mask their information. Policy makers can achieve this objective if they think about
the rules in a settlement system as a mechanism design problem. If policy makers ignore
those points and introduce new rules into a settlement system, the equilibrium allocation
of goods might be distorted.
We have shown that there is indeed an incentive-compatibility issue for the payments
network to resolve, but that there is no simple generalization about how to resolve it. In
fact, we have noted that there are two distinctive cases in which some incentive eﬃcient
mechanisms involve a binding incentive-compatibility constraint for truthful revelation that
a transfer is likely to fail, while other incentive eﬃcient mechanisms involve a binding con-
straint for truthful revelation that failure is unlikely. As a practical matter, then, an impli-
cation of using the incentive eﬃcient transaction mechanisms as payment arrangements is
that supervisory authorities ought to accord substantial discretion to the governing body
of a payments network to establish rules aimed at eliciting accurate information from mem-
bers.
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